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By EKATERINA GNEDENKO AND 
DENNIS HEFFLEy
Do  public  officials  care  about  prop-
erty values?  If so, are their decisions 
about tax rates, public spending, land 
use,  and  regional  cooperation  pay-
ing off?  Fiscal and land use data for 
Connecticut’s 169 towns offer some 
insights about development patterns 
and  how  local  public  policies  may 
affect  the  value  of  real  property—
structures and land.  We look at the 
effects  of  municipal  tax,  spending 
and land-use policies, as well as the 
impact of regional cooperation—in the 
form  of  regional  school  districts—on 
the value of real property per acre of 
available land. Fiscal policies and the 
level of development have the antici-
pated effects on property values, but 
the impact of participation in regional 
high school districts is less clear.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICES
















clear	 how	 governments	 behave.	 	The	
uncertainty	has	produced	a	variety	of	
competing	 economic	 theories	 of	 the	
public	sector.		The	“Leviathan”	theory	
views	 government	 as	 a	 self-interested	
bureaucracy	 that	 seeks	 to	 maximize	
its	size	or	influence.		Advocates	of	the	
“Laffer	 Curve”	 believe	 that	 govern-
ments	commonly	exceed	Leviathan	tax	
and	 spending	 levels,	 and	 that	 lower	
tax	 rates	 would	 generate	 even	 more	
tax	revenue	by	encouraging	economic	











The	 “open-city”	 model	 of	 local	 gov-
ernment	notes	that,	in	the	long	run,	
both	households	and	firms	are	mobile.	 	






and	 retains	 residents	 and	 businesses.	 	
For	households,	this	means	a	level	of	
“utility”	 or	 satisfaction	 that	 matches	
what	they	could	achieve	in	other	loca-
tions;	 for	 firms,	 it	 means	 a	 level	 of	
profit	competitive	with	that	available	
elsewhere.
	 But	 that	 very	 mobility	 prevents	
local	 governments	 from	 actively	 try-
ing	to	boost	the	utility	of	households	
or	 the	 profit	 of	 firms	 above	 outside	
norms.		Even	if	a	town,	say,	could	enact	
public	policies	that	would	make	local	
households	 or	 firms	 better	 off	 than	
elsewhere,	mobility	would	ensure	the	
entry	 of	 more	 households	 and	 firms,	
driving	 up	 local	 costs	 of	 living	 and	
Public Goals, Property Values
and Regional Cooperation
An “open city” model   
may shed light on how 
local policies affect real 


















the	 ill	 effects	 of	 higher	 tax	 rates	 on	
property	values;	and	public	awareness	
of	 the	 potentially	 negative	 impact	 of	
land	use	restrictions,	zoning	changes,	









LAND USE POLICIES AND 
PATTERNS
	 One	 of	 the	 most	 powerful	 tools	
available	 to	 local	 officials	 seeking	 to	
maximize	 property	 values	 is	 land-use	









pages	 8-11).	 	 Land	 zoned	 for	 com-
mercial	use	often	fetches	a	higher	price	
than	 residentially	 zoned	 areas,	 and	
allowing	more	dense	forms	of	develop-






	 To	 see	 whether	 there’s	 evidence	
of	such	a	relationship	in	Connecticut,	
we	made	use	of	data	based	on	satellite	
images	 of	 Connecticut’s	 “land	 cover”	
in	2006,	provided	by	UConn’s	Center	
for	 Land	 Use	 Education	 &	 Research	
(CLEAR).	 	 We	 first	 calculated	 each	
town’s	 “available	 acres”	 (those	 not	




(pages	 12-13),	 was	 then	 split	 into	
two	 categories:	 “developed”	 (includ-
ing	turf	and	grass	areas	associated	with	
developed	 areas)	 and	 “undeveloped.”	 	
Finally,	 for	 each	 town,	 we	 calculated	
the	value	of	real	property	per	available	
acre	by	dividing	data	on	the	total	value	
of	 real	 property,	 from	 OPM’s	 2006	











had	 per-acre	 values	 above	 $500,000;	




In 2006, the per-acre 
value of “available” land 
ranged from $7,857 in 





SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy.
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Stratford,	West	Haven,	and	Westport.	 	
For	each	of	the	other	158	towns,	with	
values	 below	 $500,000	 per	 acre,	 the	
scatter	 diagram	 below	 plots	 the	 per-
acre	 value	 and	 the	 percent	 of	 avail-
able	land	that	is	developed.		For	this	
restricted	sample	(omitting	the	11	out-






















other	 explanatory	 variables	 included	
two	 location	 variables	 (distance	 from	
New	York	and	a	dummy	variable	for	
shoreline	towns);	three	fiscal	variables	
(equalized	 mill	 rate,	 non-educational	





	 The	 regression	 coefficients	 for	
the	 expanded	 model,	 reported	 in	
the	middle	two	columns	of	the	table	









tax	 rates	 (“equalized	 mill	 rates”)	 and	
higher	spending	on	education	as	well	
as	other	public	services.		But	contrary	
to	 some	 recent	 results	 showing	 that	
many	 of	 Connecticut’s	 regional	 high	
school	districts	are	quite	efficient	(The 
Connecticut  Economy,	 Winter	 2010,	
pages	 4-7),	 a	 town’s	 participation	 in	





	 Given	 the	 strong	 cubic	 relation-
ship	in	the	plot	of	the	raw	data	(for	the	








a	 high	 correlation	 among	 the	 three	
variables.	Dropping	the	quadratic	and	
cubic	 forms	 and	 retaining	 just	 the	







MORE ON REGIONAL 
COOPERATION
	 Facing	 severe	 fiscal	 pressures	 and	
some	 hard	 choices,	 many	 local	 gov-
ernments	are	showing	renewed	inter-
est	 in	 forms	 of	 regional	 cooperation	
that	might	yield	budgetary	savings.	If	
regional	 efficiencies	 exist,	 we	 might	
expect	property	values	to	be	higher	in	











ciency	 effect”	 of	 regional	 school	 dis-
tricts	 may	 be	 swamped	 by	 a	 nega-
WILL MORE DEvELOPMENT ALWAYS 
BOOST PROPERTY vALUES?
Estimated cubic relationship based on 2006 data for 158
Connecticut towns with Real ENGL per acre less than $500,000.
 
SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy.





































Percent of Available Land Developed
Being closer to New York 
City or the shore, lower 
property tax rates, and 
higher public spending all 
raise property values. 
But being in a regional 
school district does not.SPRING 2010  THE CONNECTICUT ECONOMY  17 
tive	 “preference	 effect.”	 	 Households	
might	prefer	to	have	access	to	a	local	






















form	 of	 regional	 cooperation.	 	 But	
other	 forms	 of	 regional	 cooperation	
exist:	purchasing	cooperatives	or	agree-
ments;	 inter-local	 service	 contracts	
for	 road-maintenance,	 public	 health	
and	 other	 community	 services;	 and	
efforts	to	coordinate	land-use	policies	
via	regional	planning	authorities.		In	
the	 absence	 of	 complete	 data	 for	 all	





value	 of	 real	 property—an	 area	 of	
research	we	plan	to	pursue.
A MISGUIDED GOAL OR GOOD 
STEWARDSHIP?
	 The	 central	 thread	 of	 our	 analy-
sis	is	that	market	forces	and	political	







but	 some	 may	 view	 the	 “open-city”	
assumption	 of	 property-value	 maxi-
mization	 as	 yet	 another	 example	 of	
economists’	low	expectations	of	human	
behavior.	 	 Perhaps,	 but	 if	 property	
values	reflect	not	just	a	town’s	site	and	
socioeconomic	 conditions,	 but	 also	
“how	 the	 town	 is	 run”—its	 public	
services,	 tax	 burden,	 land-use	 poli-
cies,	and	its	decisions	about	whether	
regional	 cooperation	 will	 benefit	 its	
residents—then	 public	 officials	 who	
seek	to	enhance	property	values	may	
be	serving	the	interests	of	their	con-
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Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Constant 13,358.74 0.93 -200,813.59 0.08
1,244.71 0.09 4,884.57 0.39 9,301.94 0.00
% Developed2  161.81 0.00 14.38 0.92
% Developed3  -1.40 0.00 0.54 0.58
Distance to NY -1,534.78 0.01 -1,175.69 0.05
Shoreline  127,007.50 0.00 145,972.12 0.00
Eq. Mill Rate -7,289.07 0.04 -6,256.23 0.09
Non-ed. per cap. 140.40 0.00 146.49 0.00
Ed. per pupil 17.47 0.02 22.89 0.00
Regional HS -77,326.60 0.01 -54,162.61 0.05
Crime per 100K -74.20 0.00 -63.91 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.82 0.80
Observations 158 169 169
% Developed 
...public officials who seek 
to enhance property values 
may be serving their  
constituents well.
Coefficient values measure the unit change in the dependent variable associated with a one unit change in an independent variable, holding 
other variables constant.  A p-value is the chance of finding such an extreme coefficient value if in fact no relationship actually exists between 
the dependent and independent variable.  The smaller the p-value, the more statistically significant the result.  